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ARGUMENT
I.

CANNON IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
UNDER UTAH'S BAD FAITH STATUTE BECAUSE WARDLEY IS
IMPUTED WITH KNOWLEDGE OF AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
HANSEN'S FRAUDULENT ACTIVITIES.
Corporations do not have states of mind. Corporations do not have knowledge.

People do. The fundamental error of the lower courts that Wardley seeks to perpetuate
here is to view "Wardley" as something, or someone, separate and apart from the people
that work there . . . in particular its agents who interact with the outside world. To adopt
this position would require this Court to conclude that Wardley is not imputed with the
knowledge that its agent unquestionably had . .. that the claims against Cannon were
completely unfounded, and based on a premise known to be false. This Court rejected
that notion in Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991), and it should
do so here.
This Court should require Wardley to pay Cannon's attorney's fees because
Wardley is imputed with knowledge that its claims against Cannon were brought in bad
faith, and were without merit. Below, the trial court found that Aries Hansen ("Hansen"),
fraudulently altered the dates of certain listing agreements and fraudulently induced his
clients, the Mascaros, to enter into the listing agreements. (R. at 947-50.) The trial court
also found that Hansen was acting as Wardley's agent when he engaged in this fraudulent
conduct. (R. at 939.) And, it is undisputed that at its agent's behest, Wardley sued
Cannon, a stranger to the dealings between Wardley and the Mascaros, to collect a real
estate commission and treble damages based on the conduct of its agent, which conduct
was undisputedly fraudulent.

1

Wardley contends that Cannon is not entitled to recover her attorney's fees
because the trial court's determination that Hansen knowingly engaged in fraudulent
conduct should not be imputed to Wardley. Wardley's attempt to avoid responsibility for
the damages caused by its agent's fraud is contrary to law and is contrary to policies
espoused by this Court. A basic tenet of Utah agency/principal law, existing since before
statehood, holds that the principal is responsible for the damages caused by its agent's
fraudulent conduct.
It is a general doctrine of law t h a t . . . the principal... is held
liable to third persons in a civil suit for the frauds, deceits,
concealments, misrepresentations, torts, negligences, and
other malfeasances or misfeasances, and omissions of duty of
his agent in the course of his employment, although the
principal did not authorize or justify or participate in, or
indeed know of, such misconduct, or even if he forbade the
acts or disapproved of them. ... In all cases the rule applies,
respondeat superior, and it is founded upon public policy and
convenience; for in no other way could there be any safety to
third persons in their dealings, either directly with the
principal, or indirectly with him, through the instrumentality
of agents. In every such case the principal holds out his agent
as competent and fit to be trusted; and thereby, in effect, he
warrants his fidelity and good conduct in all matters within
the scope of his agency.
Everett v. Oregon Short Line & Utah Northern RY. Co., 9 Utah 340, 346-47, 34 P. 289,
290 (1893) (quoting Story, Doctrine of Agency, section 452)).l
This Court should not permit Wardley to escape responsibility for the fraudulent
conduct of its agent, which it will if the trial court's ruling is undisturbed. Principles of
agency and accountability, in particular where fiduciaries are concerned, should move
this Court to conclude that the trial court's findings as to Hansen's fraudulent conduct
The same doctrine is set forth by Mechem in his work on Agency (section 734).
7

necessarily, and as a matter of law, apply to Wardley. Accordingly, Cannon respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and instruct the trial
court to impose fees against Wardley under Utah's bad faith statue, § 78-27-56 Utah
Code Ann.
II.

THERE IS NO MEANINGFUL DISTINCTION BETWEEN HODGES AND
THIS CASE, AND THUS HANSEN'S ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF HIS
OWN FRAUD SHOULD BE IMPUTED TO WARDLEY
In its opposition brief, Wardley contends that Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811

P.2d 151 (Utah 1991) is distinguishable from the instant case. In Hodges, this Court
held that the knowledge and improper conduct of an agent acting in the scope of his
employment, and for the benefit of his principal, should be imputed to that principal. Id.
at 157. There, Gibson was found liable for malicious prosecution because its agent knew
the criminal charges Gibson was prosecuting were false.
In holding Gibson responsible for its agent's knowledge, this Court in Hodges
relied upon Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272 comment c, and articulated the
following rule of law:
Thus, the knowledge which Gibson's servants had in
initiating the malicious prosecution action against Hodges and
the responsibility for the initiation of the action itself is
imputed, as a matter of law, to Gibson, if Gibson's servants
acted within the scope of their authority and were motivated
either in whole or in part to carry out Gibson's purposes.

Wardley does not and cannot dispute that here, Hansen's efforts to secure a
commission were performed for the benefit of Wardley. Wardley claims, however, that
2

The facts of Hodges are fully set forth in Cannon's initial brief and will not be repeated
here.
3

Hansen was not acting within the scope of his employment with Wardley because
"[t]here is no evidence whatsoever, that Hansen had authority from Wardley to
fraudulently change dates on any listing agreements." (Appellee's brief at 15.) This
misinterprets the law, and begs the question: If Hansen weren't acting on behalf of
Wardley, how could Wardley seek a commission arising from Hansen's conduct?
The distinction that Wardley attempts to draw is meaningless. In the Hodges case,
of course "Gibson" never formally authorized or otherwise assented to its employee
embezzling money, or falsifying charges against Hodges. Nevertheless, this Court
applied the basic tenets of agency/principal law and imputed the knowledge and the
conduct of Gibson's employee to Gibson. Thus, Gibson, as the employer, was charged in
a 5-0 decision with knowingly pursuing false claims against an innocent party.
Just as in the Hodges case, "Wardley" (i.e. no one else at Wardley other than
Hansen) did not authorize Hansen to fraudulently change dates on the listing agreements
at issue. But this does not relieve Wardley of its responsibility for the damages caused by
its agent's conduct.3 Wardley's reading of the Hodges case is erroneous, primarily,
because it assumes that there is a legal difference between principal and agent in these
situations. There is no distinction between agent and principal where the knowledge of
the agent is imputed to the principal. And, the knowledge and conduct of the agent is
imputed to the principal where the agent is acting within the scope of their authority and
is motivated either in whole or in part to carry out the principal's purposes. IdL

If Wardley's analysis is correct, then the rule announced in Hodges would only apply if
the principal expressly authorized its agent to engage in improper conduct, a fact that was
not present in Hodges.
A

In the instant case, the trial court expressly found that "Hansen .. . represented
himself to be the agent of. . . Wardley.. .." (R. at 939). And of course, it was a
commission claimed by that agent that Wardley was seeking in the trial court below.
Despite the trial court's conclusion that Hansen was acting as Wardley's agent, Wardley
now claims that somehow Hansen's status as a non-managerial employee precludes a
finding that his fraudulent conduct occurred within the scope of his employment. The
facts, and Utah statutory and common law do not support this claim. Hansen had the
authority to earn a commission and sign agreements on behalf of Wardley, and that is
enough here, particularly when Wardley ratified that conduct by seeking the commission
it generated.
A.

HANSEN'S FRAUDULENT CONDUCT OCCURRED WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH WARDLEY

W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 70, at 502 (5th ed. 1984)
defines the basic function that the term "scope of employment" serves in respondeat
superior cases:
It [scope of employment] refers to those acts which are so
closely connected with what the servant is employed to do,
and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be
regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones, of
carrying out the objectives of the employment. . . . [I]n
general the servant's conduct is within the scope of his
employment if it is of the kind which he is employed to
perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits of
time and space, and is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose
to serve the master.
Id. (emphasis added.) By seeking to obtain a real estate commission for himself and
Wardley, albeit through fraudulent means, there cannot be a dispute about Hansen acting
well within his scope of employment.
5

1.

The Wardley/Hansen Relationship Meets Utah's
Three Part Test

Utah cases have tended to focus on three criteria for determining when the conduct
of an employee falls within the scope of employment.4 First, an employee's conduct
must be of the general kind the employee is employed to perform. See Keller v. Gunn
Supply Co.. 62 Utah 501, 220 P. 1063 (1923) (citing Hardeman v. Williams. 150 Ala.
415, 43 So. 726, 10 L.R.A. 653 (1907)); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228(l)(a)
(1958). That means that an employee's acts or conduct must be generally directed
toward the accomplishment of objectives within the scope of the employee's duties and
authority, or reasonably incidental thereto. In other words, the employee must be about
the employer's business and the duties assigned by the employer, as opposed to being
involved in a wholly personal endeavor. See Keller, 62 Utah at 505, 220 P. at 1064. This
element is not disputed here, particularly when Wardley was seeking entitlement to a
large percentage of the commission.
Second, the employee's conduct must occur within the hours of the employee's
work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of the employment. See Cannon v. Goodyear
4

The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958) definition of "scope of
employment" corresponds to how Utah courts have consistently defined scope of
employment. See Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., 15 Utah 2d 49, 51, 386 P.2d 910, 911
(1963); Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 119 Utah 407, 411, 228 P.2d 272, 274
(1951); Barney v. Jewel Tea Co.. 104 Utah 292, 296, 139 P.2d 878, 879 (1943); Keller v.
Gunn Supply Co.. 62 Utah 501, 220 P. 1063 (1923); Cannon v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 60 Utah 346, 208 P. 519 (1922). Cf Carter v. Bessev. 97 Utah 427, 431, 93 P.2d
490, 492 (1939). Section 228 provides in part:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) It is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of
force is not unexpectable by the master.
/:

Tire & Rubber Co.. 60 Utah 346, 351, 208 P. 519, 521 (1922); Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 228(l)(b). Wardley does not and cannot dispute that Hansen's activities
relevant to this case were within these boundaries.
Third, the employee's conduct must be motivated, at least in part, by the purpose
of serving the employer's interest. See Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., 15 Utah 2d 49, 51,
386 P.2d 910, 911 (1963); Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 119 Utah 407, 411, 228
P.2d 272, 274 (1951) ("within the scope of furthering [employer's] purpose"); Barney v.
Jewel Tea Co., 104 Utah 292, 296, 139 P.2d 878, 879 (1943). Cf Carter v. Bessey, 97
Utah 427, 431, 93 P.2d 490, 492 (1939) (finding employer not liable when employee's
conduct intended "for purposes other than the master's business"). Again, this element is
satisfied in this case as Wardley stood to benefit financially through the procurement and
receipt of a substantial commission. Here, Wardley expended significant efforts to obtain
that benefit.
III.

CANNON IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES BECAUSE THE TRIAL
COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS OF FRAUD COMMITTED BY HANSEN
ARE IMPUTED TO WARDLEY
Wardley contends that Cannon is not entitled to attorney's fees in this case "even

if Wardley is charged with Hansen's conduct" (Appellees' brief at 18.) In support of its
position, Wardley cites to the following findings of the trial court, all of which findings
are premised on the same legal error perpetuated by the Court of Appeals, i.e. that
"Wardley" should be viewed differently from its agent, Hansen. The teaching of Hodges
is that Wardley and Hansen are one and the same. Erroneously treating Wardley as
separate and distinct from Hansen, the trial court found:
1.

Wardley's suit was not without merit; [R. 1173],

7

2.
The evidence did not support the contention that
Wardley's claims were frivolous or of little weight; [R. 117374].
3.
Wardley did not have knowledge of Hansen's
fraudulent conduct; [R. 1174],
4.
Wardley strongly believed it had a claim for unpaid
commissions; Id
5.
Wardley's decision to bring a lawsuit under the listing
agreements, which on their face appeared to be legitimate,
cannot be viewed with 20/20 hindsight and the benefit of
approximately four days of trial testimony; Id
6.
Wardley's Complaint was not asserted or pursued in
bad faith; Id
7.
The record does not provide any credible support for a
finding that Wardley pursued its claim to hinder, delay,
defraud or otherwise take unconscionable advantage of
Cannon. [R.1175]; and
8.
"The totality of facts and circumstances don't point to
[an award of attorney fees to Defendants from Wardley] as
equitable. [R.1175 and 1266].
One method of avoiding this error is to apply Hodges, and assume that it was
Hansen who had been the plaintiff suing Cannon. If he had, his liability for fees in
seeking to enforce a contract he knowingly altered to extend its term would be
undisputed. The trial court could not have found that Hansen's suit had merit. Likewise,
the evidence would clearly support the conclusion that Hansen's claims were fiivolous or
of little weight
The finding, cited by Wardley that most glaringly highlights the trial court's error,
is its finding that "Wardley" did not have knowledge of Hansen's fraudulent conduct.
The trial court erroneously thought it important that apparently, no one at Wardley, other

s

than Hansen knew of his fraud. As set forth above, knowledge of Hansen's fraudulent
conduct is imputed to Wardley as a matter of law. Accordingly, Wardley is deemed to
have knowledge of Hansen's fraudulent conduct. Furthermore, it cannot be said that
Hansen believed he had a valid claim for an unpaid commission. Nor does the evidence
suggest that Hansen could have asserted claims in good faith or for any other purpose
other than "defrauding or otherwise taking unconscionable advantage of Cannon."
The fact that Wardley was the named plaintiff, rather than Hansen, is simply a
function of Utah law. Utah law precluded Hansen from being the plaintiff, and instead
required his broker, Wardley, to file suit.5 That is because under Utah's common law and
statutory scheme, the broker is entitled to the commission and, as the principal, it is both
responsible for and benefits from its agent's activities. Because Hansen was acting as an
agent for Wardley at all relevant times, because Wardley stood to share in the
commission it was seeking by trying to enforce a fraudulent contract, and because Utah
law does not distinguish between broker and agent to these real property dealings,
Hansen's knowledge of his fraud should be imputed to his principal, Wardley. Imputed
with the knowledge, and charged with the conduct of Hansen, the trial court's findings
applicable to Hansen become equally applicable to Wardley. Accordingly, Cannon is
entitled as a matter of law to recover its attorney's fees from Wardley in this case.

5

Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-10(1) prohibits a real estate agent from accepting a commission
on the sale of property directly, and requires that any consideration paid to the agent must
be paid through a principal broker with whom the agent is affiliated and licensed. See
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-10(1) (1997). In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(2)
prohibits a real estate agent from filing suit in his or her own name to recover a
commission on the sale of a property. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(2) (1997). This
statutory policy highlights and affirms the significant responsibility brokers bear for their
agent's conduct.
9

IV.

ATTORNEY'S FEES ARE PROPERLY IMPOSED ON WARDLEY BASED
ON THE "BAD ACTS" OF HANSEN
Wardley contends that "attorney's fees should only be imposed upon bad actors,

not their principals." As set forth above, the courts in Hodges, Combes and Carter make
clear that an employer is liable for the tortious conduct of its employee that occurs within
the scope of their employment if the employee's purpose or intent, however misguided in
its means, is to further the employer's business interests. See also Prosser and Keeton
§70, at 503-05.
An employer is vicariously liable for an employee's intentional tort if the
employee's purpose in performing the acts was either wholly or only in part to further the
employer's business, even if the employee was misguided in that respect. Birkner, 771
P.2d 1057. See also W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, at 505 (5th ed.
1984). See Hodges, 811 P.2d at 156-57. Applying this principle here, Wardley is
vicariously liable for Hansen's fraud, including the liability for attorneys fees that
attached once the spurious claims were asserted in bad faith and pursued through trial.
V.

REQUIRING WARDLEY TO PAY CANNON'S ATTORNEY'S FEES IS
CONSISTENT WITH THE INTENT OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56.
Without citing any authority to support its position, Wardley asserts that it should

not be responsible for its agent's fraudulent and tortious conduct because the recovery of
attorney fees under § 78-27-56 is punitive rather than remunerative. See Brief of
Appellee at 16. Wardley then argues that because it would not be held vicariously liable
for an award of punitive damages against Hansen, it should not have to compensate
Cannon for the damages caused by Hansen's fraudulent conduct. Wardley's argument is
factually inaccurate and legally unsupported.

t A

The purpose of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 is primarily remunerative, as it is
designed to compensate an innocent party for the costs associated with defending
meritless claims brought in bad faith. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 was promulgated as
House Bill 100 and discussed on February 5, 1991 by the House of Representatives at the
44th Utah Legislative General Session. The sponsor of the Bill, Representative Richard
L. Maxfield, stated that:
The purpose of this bill is to eliminate vexatious and nuisance
lawsuits. . . . If [a lawsuit is filed], there is no provision even
though the suit is later dismissed because it is frivolous,
without foundation or without merit, there is no basis to
require that person who brought the suit without foundation to
pay the cost, the attorney's fees that the party had to pay to
defend it. That many times people come in, a suit has been
brought against them without foundation or basis and they
say, well there's no basis for this. I agree, but you still have
to file an answer, you have to answer and maybe even file a
motion to dismiss . . . . But you still will have to get an
attorney to file that action or unless you can do it yourself.
Most of them cannot, they have to hire an attorney. Can I
counterclaim for my attorney's fees? The answer is "No."
When it is an action such as this, you are just out your own
attorney's fees. If you can get the action dismissed, that's the
best you can do.
Statement of Rep. Maxfield, Third Reading of H.B. 100, 44th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb.
5, 1981) (H.R. Recording Tape No. 6, side 1). Thus, the primary purpose of awarding
attorney's fees where the losing party has filed a meritless claim in bad faith is to make
the innocent party whole by compensating the prevailing party for the legal expenses
incurred in defending against a groundless suit. Id; see also Gordon v. Heimann, 715
F.2d 531, 539 (11th Cir. 1983); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 704 F.2d 652, 654 (2d Or. 1983).
This is not punishment. It is compensation.
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Unless Cannon is reimbursed for the attorney's fees she incurred in defending
against Wardley'sfrivolousclaims, she will have paid tens of thousands of dollars to
defend herself against Wardley's meritless and factuallyfraudulentclaims, and Wardley
will have pursuedfraudulentclaims with impunity. Such a result is both unjust and
contrary to the purpose of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Accordingly, this Court should
require that Wardley pay Cannon the attorney's fees she has incurred in defending
against this action.
VL

CANNON IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
UNDER UTAH'S BAD FAITH STATUTE BECAUSE WARDLEY PUT ITS
AGENT IN THE POSITION TO COMMIT FRAUD
Finally, Utah law also encourages an examination of the relative innocence of

parties in Wardley's and Cannon's positions. As between Cannon and Wardley, Wardley
should answer for its agent's conduct and pay fees to Cannon. It was Wardley who put
Hansen in the position and empowered him with the authority to deceive the Mascaros.
Wardley put Hansen in the position tofraudulentlycreate the contracts upon which
Wardley's claims against Cannon were based. And, it is undisputed that Wardley was in
a superior, and perhaps the only position to prevent the fraud of its own agent. Utah
courts have consistently held that "as between two innocent persons, one of whom must
suffer through the fraud of third, that the one who puts it in the power of the other to
practice the fraud must suffer the loss." Swartz v. White, 80 Utah 150, 152, 13 P.2d 643,
644 (1932). See also G. Eugene England Found, v. Smith's Food King, 542 P.2d 753,
755 (Utah 1975); Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Gerber, 526 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Utah
1974; Heavy v. The Commercial Nat'l Bank 27 Utah 222, 229, 75 P. 727, 729 (1904 ).

Erroneously assuming there is a legal distinction between Wardley and its
fraudulent agent, the trial court concluded that Wardley was a victim of the dishonesty of
its own agent. But Wardley suffered no loss here. Wardley stood only to benefit form its
agent's fraudulent conduct. Unless Camion is reimbursed for the attorney's fees she paid
in defending against Wardley's claims, then Cannon alone will suffer the consequences
of Hansen's dishonesty. In such circumstances, Utah courts have uniformly concluded
that the burden should fall upon Wardley, because it was "the party that held [Hansen]
out and gave him the character and standing of an honest man." Sullivan v. EvansMorris Whitney Co., 54 Utah 293, 304, 180 P. 435, 439 (1919). Because Hansen was not
an honest man, this Court should require Wardley to be responsible for its agent's bad
conduct.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court should reverse the Court of Appeals'
opinion affirming the trial court's denial of Cannon's Motion for Attorney's Fees, and
remand this case to the trial court with instructions to determine Cannon's reasonable
attorneys' fees below, and attorney's fees incurred in appealing the trial and appellate
court's rulings, pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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